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International law as a governing institution, has gained 
prominence, with the advent of globalization. This is of 
specific relevance for the governance of state-market 
relations. Nowhere has this been as pronounced as in the 
international investment regime. Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) have today become some of the most 
potent legal tools underwriting economic globalization. 
These are established through pacts, which have to be 
adhered to, through all stages of performance of the 
treaty. This paper argues against the shift of bilateral 
investment treaties (BIT) from a pro-sovereign, to a pro-
investor approach. It does so by explaining the present 
situation of bilateral investment treaties while pointing 
out their disadvantages. The basic idea of a BIT is 
questioned in order to understand its purpose and 
examines its failure in achieving the same. The partial 
approach towards the investors by the tribunals, is 
frowned upon and the lack of justifications and defenses 
on the part of the state is reviewed. Modest suggestions 
on improving this situation are provided by using cases 
decided by tribunals at an international level, taking up 
the example of Argentina. 
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I. Introduction 
A perusal of the history of investments involving state(s) and 
investor(s) clarifies that a major shift has occurred from a pro-
sovereign attitude, to a pro-investor attitude. Jean Bodin1, whose 
theory on sovereignty is well known, propounded that the ruler 
proclaims absolute sovereignty. It meant that the ruler is not legally 
responsible for the exercise of his power to any superior 
authority.2Absolute sovereignty in its classical meaning represents 
an internal concept which entitles a ruler to exercise supreme 
authority within his territory. It is not an external concept that 
would exonerate him from commitments to which he would have 
consented to, under international investment law (IIL).3 
Sovereignty in modern IIL, prescribes the legal status of a state to 
be within and not above it. This denotes an independent structure 
whereby much power and authority is available at the state’s 
disposal. Recent trends in other regions of law have observed an 
increasing retreat of the freedom of the state’s consent to submit to 
international order, thereby affecting its direct subjectivity to IIL. 
This has in return, affected territorial integrity, exclusive personal 
and territorial jurisdiction, cultural identity and freedom of self-
determination over political and socio-economic affairs. 
Globalization, defined as the internationalization of societies and 
economies has led to the spread of capitalism.4 This has further led 
to the transformation of the laws and norms followed within a 
country to match an international model. As the sovereignty lies 
upon these very laws and norms, the law too is metamorphosing 
                                                          
1 Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la republicae (1576). 
2H.Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10/12 Encyclopedia of public int’l law 397, 
402  (Bernhardt ed., 1987). 
3Id. at 403-407. 
4 Julian Ku et. al., Globalization and Sovereignty, 31 Berkeley J. Int'l Law 210, 
210 (2013). 
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internal sovereignty.5 Post World War II, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), guaranteed a standard of treatment for investors 
and provided a mechanism for addressing disputes that arose 
between the parties to these treaties.6 Such agreements rob the 
states of their sovereign immunity making themselves vulnerable 
to legal claims by foreign litigants, alleging breach in the promised 
commitments. The exercise of sovereignty of the state comes into 
question as the investor’s return on investment goes contrary to the 
sovereign’s role in regulation of economic affairs. Therefore, when 
the government’s ability to exercise internal sovereignty is 
threatened, the idea of democracy itself is threatened. 
Protectionism, competitive deregulation or subsidization of any 
particular industry will not insulate the government against the 
challenges of globalization.7 
II. Impact of Pro-Investor Based Investments on Countries  
Foreign investment is a vital tool for economic development and 
global prosperity. It allows developing countries to enhance local 
industries and receive funds from foreign investors to improve 
infrastructure. Meanwhile, investors obtain financial returns and 
gain foothold in the markets of those countries.8 The disputes that 
have arisen in this area have been looked into by many tribunals at 
the international level. Over the years, the tribunals have passed 
arbitral awards, both in favour of, and against the sovereign. In 
allowing the public and private concerns to balance out between 
legitimate and protectionist regulations, if the investment treaties 
are interpreted exclusively from an investment perspective, the 
balance is ruined. By leaving out concerns of the sovereign and 
                                                          
5 Schreuer, The Waning of the Sovereign State,4 Eur. J. Int’l Law 447, 447 
(1993). 
6Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 1 (Oxford 
International Library, 2nd ed., 2010). 
7 Wolfgang Rinicke, Global Public Policy (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53586/wolfgang-h-
reinicke/global-public-policy. 
8 Marian Nash, Bilateral Investment Treaties United States-Argentina, 87 Am. 
J. Int’l L.433, 433(1993). 
 




focusing solely on profits and returns on investment, the investors’ 
values tend to dominate.9 
In not being involved with the creation of the constitution, 
choosing its framers or participating in elections, the investors have 
unjustly claimed themselves to be more vulnerable to such 
legislations. This was held by the International Arbitral Tribunal to 
be a sufficient ground for indirect expropriation, which would 
necessitate compensation.10 Indirect expropriation also includes a 
situation where the state, by means of legislative procedures, 
brings about a minor change in the terms of the contract. This 
handicaps the investor from recovering the entire rents of business 
under the original contractual framework.11 The author contends 
that this logic is flawed. If it were true, then no legislation could be 
enacted once the investors enter the market of the host state. This 
decision is contradicted in the Enron case,12where Argentina was 
excused from expropriation, as it employed many emergency 
measures, out of economic necessity during the time of financial 
crisis. This arbitral award was subsequently annulled which 
reduces the worth of the sovereign. Taking into consideration the 
needs of a country that is going through a financial crisis, against 
the temporary losses of a globally established corporate network, 
the author firmly believes that the sovereign should be given 
priority. It is imperative that the government initiates such a 
measure as it is a matter of public policy and necessity.   
 
                                                          
9 Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s 
Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41/3 
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 775, 775 (2008). 
10Tecmed v. Mexico, ICSID Case  No: ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003, 431 
I.L.M 133(2004). 
11 Francesco Gelmetti, Indirect Expropriation under International 
Investment Law (Oct. 24, 2014), 
https://www.academia.edu/5551868/Indirect_expropriation_under_inte
rnational_investment_law. 
12 Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets L.P v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
No. ARB/01/3, 22 May 2007, AL RA 21 (2007). 
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Even beyond the losses of the investor, irreparable damages to the 
environment and the health of the populace may be caused, if the 
BIT doesn’t specify the terms of the cleanup after the agreement is 
terminated. The damage caused by the Chevron-Texaco company 
was so immense that the judiciary of Ecuador imposed a fine of $8 
billion on them, for repairing the damages caused to the 
environment. This recent case has laid down a much important 
aspect of re-negotiating all existing BITs, as a blind incorporation of 
model BIT clauses will not respect the technical distinctiveness of 
each agreement. Each BIT requires its own draft and model that 
suits the case in hand. Argentina, which emerged successful after a 
financial crisis, witnessed a movement that was strongly in favour 
of the investors. This is supported by the fact that most of the cases 
involving Argentina, have been decided against the sovereign.13 A 
set-back of $450 million, along with accrued interest, resulted in 
Argentina battling with four settlements in the 2005-08 period. 
Most of this involved, the breach of standards of fair and equitable 
treatment. Thus, it is observed that, in deciding these cases, the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
tribunal has consistently taken a pro-investor stance. However, a 
contrary approach was noticed in the case of Saluka, where the 
tribunal stated as follows: 
…protection of foreign investment is not the sole aim of the treaty... 
a balanced approach for both parties… the host state possess a 
legitimate right to regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest…14 
Thus, the rights of the state are equally important in a BIT between 
two countries. There should exist a counterbalance in the treatment 
to be accorded to the investor. If so, why is there an imbalance in 
the level of support accorded to the parties in awarding pro-
investor awards?  
 
                                                          
13 CMS Gas Transmission Company v.The Republic of Argentina, ICSID 
Case  No. ARB/01/8, 25 Sept. 2007; Azurix Corp. v. The Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, 14 July 2006. 
14Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, 17 March 2006, PCA IIC 210 
(2006). 




Apart from the above discussed topics, the right of the state to 
induce regulations reflective of public morals and policies is also 
important. Therefore, even without instances of necessity, the state 
should be allowed to create legislations for the general 
development of its public policy. As seen in the example of 
Argentina, the people of the state were deprived of their money as 
they were penalized in millions, by the tribunals. Hence it is 
inappropriate for a country to set aside a major part of its budget, 
for the purpose of paying off dues under the compulsion of BIT. 
Ideally, BIT is expected to expedite a country’s growth, and propel 
its economy. However, this also triggers an increase in the divide 
between developed and developing nations. Currently, there exist 
many defenses for the state’s acts. Though these defenses have not 
been used extensively in the last decade, it is important to 
understand them. These include force majeure, coercion and 
duress, necessity, corruption and fundamental change of 
circumstances.15 Although the last decade witnessed an increase in 
the number of countries utilizing the provisions of the BIT, the 
above mentioned defenses have never been invoked, inspite of 
these provisions being assumed to be part of every agreement 
entered into between the parties.16 
It is established that there exists an increasing dissatisfaction 
towards investor-state arbitration. Albeit a recent development, the 
IIL will have relevance in the coming future. In the absence of a 
global comprehensive convention on how to address disputes that 
arise in such an instance, it is necessary to have a clear model BIT. 
ICSID and such similar tribunals will be in charge of the arbitration 
procedure but the change has to begin at the roots of the 
agreement. The author believes that he has, by now established that 
there exists an order which promotes investors in every dispute. 
This modern trend is not only dangerous for the future but also 
affects the faith of parties to such agreements. Under such 
circumstances what alterations should be made to the existing 
procedure and regulations, so that this dwindling character of 
investment laws is reversed? Primarily, the present BITs require re-
                                                          
15 R. Doak Bishop Et. Al., Foreign Investment Disputes, Cases, Materials 
and Commentary 1171 (Kluwer International Law, 2014). 
16 Id at 1171. 
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negotiation to include all the defenses discussed. Among these, 
Force majeure and public policy are the most important ones. 
Without restricted grant of defenses, the tribunals need to look into 
the case for the merits of the facts and take note that the judgement 
awarded by them has far-reaching effects. Such an award should 
not be overbearing on either of the parties. Acts performed under 
necessities of state character must be taken for dispute resolution 
and not be complained about. The sovereign is required to design 
the measure against the investor during socio-economic 
emergency. On the investment horizon, the investor has a well-
established stance, complete with rules, defenses and standards. 
To suggest modest measures like settling the disputes within 
themselves or to even further their business relations by repeating 
investments with renewed and re-negotiated BITs will allow both 
parties to raise a monetary fund to repair the previous losses and 
also to add on to profits. The voluntary action that countries 
deserve at this point of time is to consent or elect to appoint 
themselves as part of the convention. With much mainstream 
movement, the smaller countries need the delicate care to adapt 
themselves to globalization. In the cases of Argentina and other 
Latin American countries, the ICSID has awarded huge sums 
against them, warding them off and influencing them to exit from 
such dangerous ventures. Moreover, governments that sign treaties 
are always changing in this world, which has a penchant for 
democracy. Thus, when the drafts are being made, it is essential to 
note that the agreement has a provision for re-negotiation and has a 
solid foundation. Countries like Germany, China and Morocco 
have initiated the renegotiation of BIT. 
III. Conclusion 
It can be argued that the international stance on BITs is largely 
partial towards the investor, and that there has been a shift from a 
pro-sovereign attitude to a pro-investor attitude. Over the recent 
years, the number of BITs that have been signed is astronomical. 
Hence it is now important to develop BITs that cater to the needs of 
the parties as discussed in this paper. The defenses have to be 
recorded in writing the BITs and the terms of agreement and 
environmental conditions have to be specified. Smaller, younger 




and lesser developed countries require the incentive to sign more 
BITs and stop evading such ventures. For this, the tribunals need to 
stop intimidating these countries by awarding huge amounts 
against them. By providing more provisions for reconciling and 
repairing damages, the institutions of arbitration can control the 
success of IIL. The examples of Argentina and other Latin 
American countries bear witness to what the fractional attitude 
towards the investor amounts to. It is only fair that the sovereign is 
also granted defenses to support its claim. In view of this, the 
author has suggested some modest defenses that can help bridge 
the divide between the investor and the state. 
 
 
 
